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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar rests on 
an intuitive, yet increasingly contested principle in our money-saturated 
electoral landscape: “Judges are not politicians . . . .”1 The Court held that 
state restrictions on direct solicitation of contributions by judicial candidates 
do not violate the First Amendment because they are narrowly tailored to 
states’ compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of their judiciary.2 The 
decision appears to, for the time being, mitigate the inconsistencies between 
the High Court’s campaign finance decisions, most notably Citizens United v. 
FEC3 and McCutcheon v. FEC,4 and states’ interests in an unbiased and 
minimally politicized judiciary. 
                                                                                                                     
  J.D. Candidate 2016, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. The author 
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 1 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from placing restrictions on corporate independent campaign 
expenditures). 
 4 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (holding unconstitutional limits on 
aggregate campaign contributions as impermissible restrictions on the First Amendment 
right to participate in democracy through political contributions). 
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The Sixth Circuit is the first appeals court to directly apply the Williams-
Yulee standard. In O’Toole v. O’Connor,5 a unanimous panel rejected a facial 
challenge under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause to Rule 
4.4(E) of Ohio’s Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judicial candidates 
from soliciting contributions more than ten months in advance of the election 
in most years and more than twelve months before the election during 
presidential election years.6 The court relied almost exclusively on Williams-
Yulee in resolving the First Amendment claim and holding that Ohio’s interest 
in maintaining the integrity of its judiciary was a compelling interest and that 
the restriction was sufficiently tailored to this interest.7 
In contrast to this straightforward application of the Williams-Yulee 
standard, the court’s resolution of the O’Toole plaintiff’s Equal Protection 
claim raises as many questions as it answers. Part II of this Comment analyzes 
the plaintiff’s Equal Protection argument and the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on that 
claim in O’Toole. Based on that ruling, I argue that this may provide an early 
signal of problems to come in judicial campaign finance regulation in the wake 
of Williams-Yulee. Finally, in Part III of this Comment, I identify and analyze 
certain classes of plaintiffs that may bring cognizable Equal Protection 
challenges to Ohio’s judicial campaign finance restrictions under the O’Toole 
ruling. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION: INCUMBENTS AND CHALLENGERS 
The plaintiff, Colleen O’Toole, holds a seat on Ohio’s intermediate court 
of appeals and is seeking nomination for election to the Ohio Supreme Court. 
She claimed that Rule 4.4(E) violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
discriminating in favor of candidates with significant retained funds, who may 
spend this money in support of their campaigns during the same period their 
challengers are prohibited from soliciting contributions.8 
O’Toole argued that prohibiting fundraising results in a disparity of funds 
that, in the context of an election, results in a disparity of speech.9 Each of the 
identified Supreme Court candidates is a sitting judge who had previously run 
for election and retained funds in their campaign accounts.10 The plaintiff held 
$93 in her account, while the three other announced candidates held funds 
                                                                                                                     
 5 O’Toole v. O’Connor, 802 F.3d 783, 789 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 6 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(E) (2015). 
 7 O’Toole, 802 F.3d at 789–91.  
 8 Id. at 791.  
 9 Principal Brief of Appellant Friends to Elect Colleen M. O’Toole at 48, O’Toole, 
802 F.3d 783 (No. 15-3614). 
 10 Id. at 3, 6 (identifying Maureen O’Connor, the current Chief Justice on the Ohio 
Supreme Court, Patrick DeWine, a judge on Ohio’s First District Court of Appeals, and 
Patrick Fischer, also a judge on Ohio’s First District Court of Appeals).  
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ranging into five and six figures.11 O’Toole argued that she was effectively 
muted until she was permitted to raise more money, while her opponents were 
free to spend (and therefore speak) voluminously.12 
The Sixth Circuit rejected this David and Goliath portrayal. The disparity 
in speech, the court found, was “not from any lack of equality in the rule 
itself,” but simply from difference in the amounts that previous campaigns had 
raised and spent.13 Since it was O’Toole’s own shortcomings in fundraising or 
frugality that was the true “cause of the disparity,” her Equal Protection 
argument failed.14 The court apparently did not believe that O’Toole had 
demonstrated that Rule 4.4(E) created two classes of candidates. 
However, the Sixth Circuit panel, speaking through Judge Clay, indicated 
how a future plaintiff could demonstrate that Rule 4.4(E) discriminates against 
certain classes of candidates. In dicta, the court noted that the fundraising 
restriction “may have a differential effect on [some] candidates.”15 The court 
identified plaintiffs “who have not previously sought judicial office” as 
potentially being disfavored under Rule 4.4(E), since those candidates “could 
not have retained any funds in a prior election cycle to spend in a subsequent 
cycle.”16 And the court did not stop there. In dismissing O’Toole’s Equal 
Protection claim, the court noted that she had not challenged Rule 4.4(I)(1),17 
which sets tiered caps on individual contributions to candidate committees 
based on the court to which the candidate seeks election.18 
The court seemed to reject O’Toole’s Equal Protection challenge because 
she had not properly delineated between a favored class of candidates and 
those disfavored by Rule 4.4(E). Essentially, O’Toole had only demonstrated 
that she had limited money, not that Rule 4.4(E) was discriminatory. The 
court’s discussion of Rule 4.4(I)(1), which reaches beyond what was necessary 
for the court to resolve the issue before it, indicates that the court sensed an 
Equal Protection issue lurking within Canon 4 (or Rule 4.4) but that O’Toole 
had failed to properly frame the argument. The court’s dicta on this point 
conspicuously leaves the door open for future plaintiffs to bring a successful 
Equal Protection challenge to Rule 4.4. 
The court’s discussion of O’Toole’s Equal Protection claim is brief, but it 
provides a sufficient window for future litigants to challenge Ohio’s judicial 
campaign finance rules. While the Williams-Yulee decision seems to present a 
solid obstacle to First Amendment challenges to these laws, O’Toole may 
provide an avenue for litigants to challenge these restrictions on Equal 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Id. at 6 (stating that the identified candidates reported that, as of December 31, 
2014, their campaign committees held between $21,674.37 and $245,493.50). 
 12 Id. at 49. 
 13 O’Toole, 802 F.3d at 791. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 791 n.1.  
 18 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(I)(1) (2015). 
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Protection grounds. Some potential classes of litigants who might bring such 
challenges are discussed in the next section.  
III. CHALLENGING RULE 4.4: THE OUTSIDER  
AND THE LADDER CLIMBER 
The language discussed in the previous section may serve as a stepping-
stone for further challenges to Ohio’s system of regulating judicial campaign 
finances by way of the Equal Protection Clause. The challenges outlined in 
this Comment may hold special appeal to legal critics of campaign finance 
regulation, as they reinforce the notion that such regulations have the effect, 
possibly even the design, of protecting incumbents.19 Two classes of potential 
plaintiffs are profiled below. 
A. The Outsider 
The ideal Outsider has never before sought judicial office. The Outsider, 
however, is not a true outsider: she is a successful attorney with a large firm 
who maintains a stellar professional reputation and is well-qualified for the 
Ohio bench. Standing in her way is Judge Incumbent. He has held a seat on the 
court of common pleas for decades, and has rarely faced a serious challenge 
due to his exceptional fundraising ability. 
The odds are against the Outsider in her challenge against Judge 
Incumbent. He has retained significant funds from previous races. Meanwhile, 
the Outsider is hobbled in her effort to begin laying the groundwork of her 
campaign. Because the race takes place during a presidential election year, 
Rule 4.4(E) prohibits her from raising funds until January.20 She is forced to 
maintain her practice full time until she is able to raise enough funds to 
support her candidacy. 
In her as-applied challenge to Rule 4.4(E), the Outsider will argue that the 
fundraising restriction creates two classes of candidates: incumbents and 
challengers. She will seek to demonstrate that the restriction on fundraising 
operates as a restriction on speech for challengers, while permitting incumbent 
judges to speak through their retained funds. She will argue that Ohio has no 
                                                                                                                     
 19 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10-238) (concerning Arizona’s public 
financing system, Justice Scalia stated, “It seems to me it’s very much pro-incumbent 
rather than anti-incumbent[,] . . . which one should expect campaign finance restrictions to 
be.”); Sarah Childress, James Bopp: What Citizens United Means for Campaign Finance, 
FRONTLINE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/james-bopp-what-
citizens-united-means-for-campaign-finance/ [https://perma.cc/5H8T-VQJT]; Bradley A. 
Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Winter 2010, 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-myth-of-campaign-finance-reform 
[https://perma.cc/KTK3-6VP3]. 
 20 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(E). 
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legitimate interest in preventing the speech of nonjudge candidates while 
simultaneously allowing sitting judges to speak.  
B. The Ladder Climber 
The Ladder Climber has served two terms on the Ohio Court of Appeals 
and now is seeking a seat on the Supreme Court. Although he has been a 
prodigious fundraiser, he has only retained a modest amount because he serves 
in an expensive media market and Rule 4.4(I) has prevented him from raising 
more than $1,200 from any individual, $3,600 from any organization, and 
$72,700 from his political party.21 
The Ladder Climber is challenging a two-term incumbent on the Supreme 
Court. The incumbent has served previously as a state senator and has always 
been a stellar fundraiser. She has retained a staggering amount of money 
because, as a previous Supreme Court candidate, Rule 4.4(I) has allowed her 
to receive contributions of up to $3,600 from individuals, $6,700 from 
organizations, and $363,000 from her party in previous cycles.22 Rule 4.4(E) 
prevents the Ladder Climber from raising funds before November in the year 
prior to the election,23 meaning he will almost certainly be disadvantaged in 
campaign expenditures. Meanwhile, the incumbent justice began using her 
retained funds a year before the general election to travel around the state and 
meet with potential supporters. 
The Ladder Climber’s Equal Protection challenge will focus on the 
cumulative effect of subsections (E) and (I) of Rule 4.4. He will argue that 
these provisions operate to discriminate against nonincumbents and function to 
protect sitting Supreme Court justices. The Ladder Climber will need to make 
a factual demonstration that subsection (E) prevents him from mounting an 
effective campaign by prohibiting him from raising the necessary funds.  
C. Evaluating the Challengers 
Both challengers will seek to characterize the rules as unfair and 
discriminatory, and as functioning to protect incumbents, but the two claims 
will have some analytical distinctions. The Outsider can claim that she is being 
silenced because she is prohibited from raising contributions, but the Ladder 
Climber can make no such claim because he is permitted to spend his retained 
funds from previous elections. The Ladder Climber will also have to overcome 
the heightened state interest in restricting the fundraising activities of sitting 
                                                                                                                     
 21 Id. at r. 4.4(I). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at r. 4.4(E). 
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judges. The state has a reduced interest in restricting the fundraising of 
nonjudges who are seeking judicial office.24  
These distinctions give the Outsider the more compelling claim. She is 
being entirely silenced, and regulating the speech of a person who is not a 
sitting judge is, arguably, not narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in 
preserving judicial integrity. To increase his chances of success, the Ladder 
Climber should attempt to make a factual demonstration that the fundraising 
restriction severely burdens his ability to effectively make his case to the 
voters. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Roberts’ maxim that “[j]udges are not politicians”25 remains 
aspirational. As political dysfunction and policy stagnation continues to be the 
rule and not the exception in Washington, states will continue to be the 
primary arena for important policy decisions on labor, reproductive rights, and 
education. It is only natural that state courts, as the ultimate arbiters and 
interpreters of these laws, will receive increasing political pressure and 
political spending. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in O’Toole is likely to inspire 
future candidates to challenge restrictions on judicial fundraising.26 Whether 
that litigation will weaken the fragile peace ushered in by Williams-Yulee 
remains to be seen. 
                                                                                                                     
 24 See Wolfson v. Concannon, 750 F.3d 1145, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a 
state law restricting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds was not 
narrowly tailored as applied to judicial candidates who were not sitting judges). 
 25 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). 
 26 In addition to Ohio, other states within the Sixth Circuit similarly restrict judicial 
campaign contributions monetarily and temporally. See KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(B)(2) (2005); MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2)(d) (2013); TENN. 
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.4(B) (2012). 
